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I. Statement of the Case.
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the entry of judgment dismissing an inverse condemnation and
breach of contract action filed by Plaintiffs/Appellants (collectively "the Days") against the State
of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("the State") arising out of the construction in the 1960's
of what is now known as 1-84 and construction of the 1-84 Isaacs Canyon Interchange in 1997.

1

B. The Course of the Proceedings Below
The Days filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") on
November 1, 2016, alleging inverse condemnation, breach of contract and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. R p. 11. The State answered on November 25, 2016, denying all
claims and asserting a statute of limitations defense. R p. 117. Both parties filed several partial
summary judgment motions, and the State filed a motion to dismiss that the trial court treated as
a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56.
All of those motions were pending until the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision

and Order on October 11, 2017 (R p. 934); along with a separate Judgment of the same date (R
p. 966). The trial court held that:
1. Only the plaintiffs who had an ownership interest in the Days' property at the
time of the alleged "taking" in 1997 - Donna Day Jacobs and David R. Day have standing to pursue an inverse condemnation claim.
2. None of the Days have standing to prosecute the breach of contract claims.
3. All of the Days' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
1

The Isaacs Canyon IC is the next one to the east of the Gowen Road IC.

l

The Days appealed from the Judgment on November 13, 2017 (R p. 968), and then filed their
Amended Notice ofAppeal on December 12, 2017 (R p. 974).

C. Statement of the Facts
In 1961, the State was in the process of constructing I-SON, now known as 1-84, and
towards that end approached the owners of the Initial Day Property2, who at the time included
Emma N. Day, Ernest E. Day, Robert L. Day and Donald M. Day ("the Owners"), about
acquiring some of the Initial Day Property for construction of a section ofl-80N. R pp. 14, 15660.
The State and the Owners could not agree on a purchase price, so in 1961 they entered
into an "Agreement" (R p. 156) that allowed the State to take possession of the right of way
needed to build what is identified in the Agreement as the I-80N-2(3)61 section of l-80N. That
section began at the west or northerly side (towards Boise) of the Initial Day Property, went
through the Initial Day Property and ran east to Black's Creek Road. R 19, pp. 512, 516-523. 3
The I-I80N-2(3 )61 section required 8.99 acres of the Initial Day Property, but provided no right
of way for a future frontage access road. R p. 512.
As the Agreement indicated, because the next or "northerly" section of I-80N had not
been "formulated", its effect, to include "the possible construction of an interchange, frontage
roads and so forth", "on the Owners' property rights" was unknown.

R pp. 156-57. The

referenced interchange was, of course, the Gowen Road IC eventually constructed as part of the

2
3

The Days use the term "Initial Day Property" to refer to the original purchase of land in 1935. R p. 13.
In the highway plans located at R pp. 516-23, the plans are labeled as I-80N-2(3)61 (RW) and I-80N-2(3)62 for
reasons unknown at this point.
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"northerly" section. R p. 43. Once the plans for the "northerly" section were developed, the
State was to pay a "fair and reasonable price" for the 8.99 acres acquired for the I-80N-2(8)63
section of I-80N. The payment was to include compensation for severance damages. R p. 158.
In 1967, after plans for the "northerly" section, I-IG-80N-2(16)54, were developed and
construction of the I-80N-2(3)61 section of I-80N through the Initial Day Property completed,
the State and the Owners negotiated the payment. Key to those negotiations was the fact that the
Initial Day Property would no longer have physical access to public roads. As is evident from
the diary maintained by the State's right of way negotiator at the time, the Owners understood
that the right of way for the "future frontage road" as identified in the northerly section plans (IIG-2( 16)54) was not going to provide a road to access to their property:
Don [Day] asked who would be willing to buy this land now that it has no access .
. . . He stated that they had purchased this land for speculation and feel if there
were still good access remaining, that it would be developed to a housing unit
within I0-20 years. He also stated that with just a legal access and no physical
access, that the land has been damaged to a point where no value is left. . . . He
also stated he doesn't feel the State is being realistic in its appraisal because of the
loss of access.
R pp. 491-93 (emphasis added). The appraisals conducted for the State at the time also make
clear that the Initial Day Property would not have access restored.

From the Robert Stout

appraisal:
The land on the south consisting of 139.58 ac. will lose the access to the hwy.
There will be r/w provided for the land along the interstate r/w but there will be
no road and the cost ofthe road would be more than the land would be worth.
Due to the poor access in the after it would be reduced in value for dry graze.
Poor access to this land due to the fact you could not get in by car in the after.

3

R p. 461 (emphasis added). From the William Onweiler appraisal:
Access is now only by a 50' frontage road along the West side of the Interstate.
This road will be improved to within about 1.8 miles to the North .. . Due to the
loss of direct access, the possible time of residential development is considerably
postponed and now dependent on the development of lands between the subject
and the Interstate connector, two miles to the North....
Access to the remaining property is now by a 50' right-ofway that is
undeveloped. This is the same as putting the subject 1 Yi miles from a paved road
on a section line since access is from a frontage road is [sic] left for the parcel.
The road comes from Gowen Road on the West side of the Interstate. It is
improved approximately one-halfmile and unimproved approximately 1 Vz miles.
R p. 477-78 (emphasis added). Plainly, the Owners and the State understood that the Initial Day
Property would be left without a road to access their property, and would only have access to the
unimproved "Future Frontage Road" right of way owned by the State.
Ultimately, the State and the Owners agreed to the settlement expressed in a "Right of
Way Contract" ("Contract"). R p. 166. The payment of $6000 reflected in the Contract covers
the purchase of 8.99 acres of the Initial Day Property used for construction of the I-80N-2(3)61
section of I-80N and access rights to the new interstate highway, as well as severance damages to
the remaining property for loss of access. 4 The contract further provides that access to the
remainder of the Initial Day Property south of the new interstate would be from the "future
frontage road and stock drive on the southwesterly side of l-80N. (I-IG-80N-2(16)54)." R p.
166. The highway plans referenced in the Contract were for the interstate section to the west or
"northerly" of the Initial Day Property, and contained the location of the right of way for the
future frontage road and stock drive.
4

R pp. 219-223.

Per the plans for section I-IG-80N-

The Days admit that the payment included loss of access to their property from the new highway. See Appellants ·
Opening Brief. p. 5.

4

2( 16)54, none of the Initial Day Property was acquired for the future frontage road. R pp. 219223.
Appraiser Stout had valued the entire Initial Day Property at $7,018 (R p. 460), while
Appraiser Onweiler had valued it at $11,700 (R p. 476). Thus, based on those appraisals, the
$6000 paid to the Owners represented about 51 % to 85% of the value of the entire Initial Day
Property. If the State had to pay 51 % - 85% of the property value and build a road that would
cost more that the Initial Day Property was worth (per the Stout appraisal), the State would have
just bought out the Initial Day Property for a few thousand more dollars than were paid to settle
the condemnation. 5
Per the Contract, the Owners delivered to the State a Warranty Deed for the property
rights being acquired. R p. 169. The Warranty Deed reserved to the Initial Day Property access
rights to the "Future Frontage Road and Stock Drives [sic] on the Southwesterly side of the
Interstate 80N. Project No. I-IG-80N-2(16)54 Highway Survey." R p. 170.

By signing the

Right of Way Contract, the Owners also waived any claims based on the transfer of right of way
to the state and the "location, grade and construction of the proposed highway". R p. 42.
Nowhere in the 1961 Agreement for possession, the 1967 Right of Way Contract, the
1967 Warranty Deed, the highway plans or any other document is there language providing that
the State would build a public road to access the Initial Day Property.

s Nothing the Days state in footnote 1 on page 6 of Appellants' Opening Brief is supported in the record. This is
especially true of the Days' claim about what Don Day was thinking in 1967.

5

In I979, the Owners purchased an additional I 60 acres adjacent to and southeast of the
Initial Day Property. R p. 253. See the diagram at R p. 164. The Days refer to the totality of the
Initial Day Property and the 1979 purchase as the "Day Property". R pp. 16- I 7.
As is common knowledge, Micron wanted an 1-84 interchange for its manufacturing
facility. The Isaacs Canyon Interchange is that interchange. By December 5, 1997, the State
completed construction of the Isaacs Canyon Interchange. R p. 224. Because the footprint of the
new interchange overlay a portion of the original right of way for the "Future Frontage Road",
the State moved that right of way so that it was adjacent to the south side of the new Isaacs
Canyon IC. As of December 5, 1997, only two of the current plaintiffs - Donna Day Jacobs and
David R. Day - had an ownership in the Day Property.
The Days did not like the relocated section of right of way for the future frontage road
and stock drive. R pp. 65-66. In response to the Days' concerns, between 1997 and 2000 the
State acquired easements to replace the relocated right of way. R pp. 50-57; 72-75; 77-84. See
the diagram at R p. 85, which shows in blue an easement for access acquired by the State to
replace the portion of the relocated right of way. The access easements acquired by the State
were intended to connect the Day Property to the new section of Eisenman Road created as part
of the Isaacs Canyon IC project.
In a letter dated July 19, 2000, Steve Parry, a now-retired Deputy Attorney General
representing the Idaho Transportation Department, wrote to the Days' attomey6 and indicated

6

The record does not reflect who the Days' attorney actually represented at the time, but it would not have been all
of the current appellants because, for example, Holcomb Road Holdings, LLC did not have an ownership interest

6

that ..the Department will not assert any type of statute of limitations defense if an agreement on
new access cannot be reached." R p. 326. 7 No documentation exists in the record to substantiate
further contact between the Days and the State until 2010.
During that ten year gap, the Days became interested in selling the Day Property. R p.
257. In late 2005, the Days sold the Day Property to Craig Groves for $10,010,000.00. R pp.
203-210, 213.

Nothing in the record indicates that Groves had any trouble obtaining title

insurance for his purchase.

Groves defaulted on the sale in December 2008, so the Days

recovered the Day Property from Groves and kept about $4.9 million in proceeds from the sale.
R p. 213.

In 2010 the State became involved in the Days' efforts to obtain title insurance for the
Day Property. R p. 336-37. After 2010, the record reflects no contact between the State and the
Days until 2014 when the parties again attempted to address the Days' access concerns. R pp.
99-114. Those attempts included a request to have the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD")
take jurisdiction over any access road built on the State's easements.

R p. 363.

ACHD

ultimately stated it would not take jurisdiction over any public road intersecting with Eisenman
Road between the off-ramp for 1-84 and a location about 1800 feet to the other side of what has
become the "green gate" location. R p. 363.
The easement obtained by the State for access still exists and could provide access to the
Day Property. R p. 422. ACHD is willing to allow an approach for the easement on its portion
in the Day Property until 20 13. Appellants' Opening Brief. p. 4. Nor is it likely that the Days' attorney at the
time represented the interests of all the devisees of the original owners of the Initial Day Property.
7
The State did not, as asserted by the Days, promise to waive the statute of limitations defense until all efforts were
exhausted in an attempt to restore public access. See Appellants' Opening Brief. p. 2.
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of Eisenman Road. R pp. 421-22. The State is willing to provide an approach for the access
easement on the State's portion of Eisenman Road. R p. 422. The Days could build an access
road on the easement. R p. 422. The easement's 24.9 foot connection to the Day Property is
adequate for an approach from the easement onto the Day Property. R p. 425. Contrary to the
assertion of the Days, the State has never attempted to build a road on the access easement.
II. Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Because the Days' contract claims are based on a commercial transaction - the acquisition of
land - the State seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3).
III. Argument.

A. Standard of Review

The applicable appellate standard of review from a grant of summary judgment is well known:
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same
standard as the district court." [cite omitted] Summary judgment is appropriate "if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). "Disputed
facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." [cites omitted] "However, the nonmoving party cannot rely on
mere speculation, and a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact." [ cites omitted].
Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, _

, 413 P.3d 731, 735 (2018).

If a trial court fails to follow procedural requirements when converting an LR.C.P.
12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion, the resulting judgment may be upheld if the
error was harmless under I.R.C.P. 61. Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 162 Idaho 866, 406 P.3d
878 (2017); Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,843,243 P.3d 642, 659 (2010). In determining

8

whether an alleged procedural error was harmless, this Court "must disregard all errors and
defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." Paslay, 162 Idaho at 872. "If - by
considering only the pleadings - this Court finds under Rule 12(b)(6) that Appellants failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, then the procedural error below is harmless."
Paslay, 162 Idaho at 872 (citing Taylor, 149 Idaho at 849). In reviewing the pleadings, this

Court is to view all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 13 7
Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002).
Other than the Days' insistence that the State promised to build a public access road, no
genuine issue of material fact exists in this case. The State's alleged promise is not actually
material to the Judgment issued by the trial court. Rather, the trial court's Judgment hinges on
the interpretation and application of law to an essentially uncontested set of facts. For example, a
critical issue on appeal is the interpretation of I.C. § 5-238, which "is a question of law over
which this Court exercises free review." Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 881, 231 P.3d
524, 526 (2009) (citing State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001)). The trial
court properly interpreted LC. § 5-238, and even if it didn't, a reasonable interpretation would
result in the Days' claims being time barred.
Similarly, the conversion of the State's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion was, at
worst, harmless error. The Days had a reasonable opportunity to provide any pertinent material
relating to the statute of limitations issue. Additionally, if only the pleadings are considered, the
State is still entitled to judgment based on the statute of limitations.

9

The issue of standing also involves application of established or generally accepted legal
principles to a set of undisputed facts.

Ownership of property at the time it is inversely

condemned is a prerequisite to having standing to prosecute an inverse condemnation claim.
Because an inverse condemnation claim is personal property, it is not conveyed with real
property as an appurtenance.
Based on the proper standard of review, this Court should affirm the Judgment of the trial
court.

B. The Statute of Limitations Bars the Days' Claims
1. The Days' inverse condemnation claim accrued when the State completed the
Isaacs Canyon Interchange Project.
a. The project completion rule governs the date the Days' inverse
condemnation claim accrued.
"The date when a cause of action accrues is a question of law to be determined by this
Court where no disputed issues of material fact exist." Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthorne, 147
Idaho 401, 405, 210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009) (citing C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139
Idaho 140, 142, 75 P.3d 194, 196 (2003). The fact that the State completed the Isaacs Canyon IC
by December 5, 1997 is undisputed. "When the government takes private property by means of
a construction project without condemnation proceedings, the statute of limitations, for purposes
of bringing an inverse condemnation claim, is triggered upon completion of construction." C &

G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 145. In C & G, Inc., Idaho adopted the "project completion" rule for
determining when an inverse condemnation action accrues as a result of a physical taking
because it is upon completion of a project that "damages can be fully assessed." C & G, Inc.,

1.0

139 Idaho at 144. December 5, 1997 is also the '"point in time at which the impairment, of such
a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs• property interest,
became apparent"'. Harris, 147 Idaho at 405 (quoting Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho
667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979)). The Days' inverse condemnation claim falls squarely
within the holding in C & G, Inc. and accrued for statute of limitations purposes on December 5,
1997.
The date an inverse condemnation case accrues is also, by law, the date used to value
damages:
In such an informal taking this Court has decided that damages for inverse
condemnation should be assessed at the time the taking occurs. [cites omitted]
The time of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time
that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property
becomes apparent. [ cite omitted]
McCuskey v. Canyon Cty. Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 216- 17, 912 P.2d 100, 103-04 (1996). See

also, Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670 ("These two factors, both the extent and the measure of damages,
are inextricably fixed by a finding of the time of taking."). As the allegations set forth in their
Complaint and other pleadings make clear, the Days have taken the position that the alleged
taking of their reserved access rights occurred upon the project's completion in 1997.8 •9 •10•11 •12
The Days also stipulated in open court that the date for valuation of their inverse condemnation
and contract claims would be December 5, 1997. Tr p. 6, L. 6 - p. 7, L. 14. In so alleging and
8

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Para. 47. R p. 30.
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Para. 52. R p. 31.
10
Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs· Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver
ofStatute ofLimitation Defense. R pp. 246-47.
11
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R p. 374.
12
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R pp. 375-76.
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11

stipulating, the Days by law agreed to the same date for the accrual of their mverse
condemnation cause of action for statute of limitations purposes.

Based on the project

completion rule, as well as the Days' statements and stipulation, no disputed issue of material
facts exists, so as a matter of law their inverse condemnation claim accrued as of December 5,
1997 for statute of limitation purposes.
b. The justifiable uncertainty doctrine does not apply to the Days' inverse
condemnation claim.
The Days' reliance on the 'justifiable uncertainty doctrine" to establish any date other
than December 5, 1997 as the date of accrual of their inverse condemnation claim is without
merit. This Court has already determined that in order to "activate a new statute of limitations
period", "some additional activity which causes interference with the property by a condemner"
is required. Wadsworth v. Dep't of Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P.2d 1, 5 (1996).

It is

undisputed that no additional construction activity by the State has interfered with the Day
Property since completion of the Isaacs Canyon IC.
In Wadsworth, 128 Idaho 439, the plaintiff landowner cross-claimed against the Idaho
Transportation Department for an erosion-caused inverse condemnation based on a single event
- streambed gravel extraction.

The landowner tried to avoid the statute of limitations by

asserting that it could not be applied to a constitution-based takings claim. This Court rejected
that argument, and in upholding the grant of summary judgment noted that there "was a single
event, and that event triggered the running of the limitation period in l.C. § 5-224 when the
impairment was of such a degree and kind that substantial interference with [the landowner's]

12

property interest became apparent." Wadsworth, 128 Idaho at 443 (citing Tibbs, 100 Idaho at
671; Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1982)). The same logic applies to
the Days' inverse condemnation claim. It arose out of a single event - the completion of the
Isaacs Canyon IC, and the statute of limitations began to run at that time.
The justifiable uncertainty doctrine is a narrow exception that applies to an unusual
takings situation involving the stabilization doctrine that was first addressed in United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 67 S. Ct. 1382, 91 L. Ed. 1789 ( 1947). Mildenberger v. United States,

643 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, involved a taking of land by erosion
resulting from impoundment of water behind a dam. The lawsuits over the taking were filed
seven years after the point in time when the dam began to impound water, so the government
argued that the six year statute oflimitations had run.
The court rejected that argument based on the lack of a single event causing the take:
The source of the entire claim- the overflow due to rises in the level of the
river- is not a single event; it is continuous. And as there is nothing in reason, so
there is nothing in legal doctrine, to preclude the law from meeting such a process
by postponing suit until the situation becomes stabilized.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 749 (emphasis added).

It is undisputed that the Days' mverse

condemnation claim does not involve a "continuous" event.
The justifiable uncertainty doctrine apparently first appeared in Applegate v. United
States, 25 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Therein, the court addressed a claim involving a slow

physical take of land by erosion complicated by efforts made by the government to mitigate the
erosion. As a result, "the landowners did not know when or if their land would be permanently

13

destroyed."

Applegate, 25 F.3d at 1582.

The court noted that "precisely because of the

Government's promises to build a sand transfer plant, the landowners remain justifiably

uncertain about the permanency of the erosion and the talcing." Applegate, 25 F.3d at 1583
(emphasis added). Such facts have no relevance to the Days' inverse condemnation claim. No
continuous process caused the loss of the Days' access rights to the right of way for the future
frontage road, so there were no mitigation efforts to employ.
The project completion rule governs the accrual of the Days' inverse condemnation
claim. Upon completion of the Isaacs Canyon IC project, damages, if any, were obvious and of
such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest.
Therefore, rejection of the justifiable uncertainly doctrine is mandated.

c. Accrual of an inverse condemnation claim is not subject to a discovery
rule.
The Days argue that their inverse condemnation claim did not accrue because they did
not discover the permanent nature of their damages until May 16, 2016. They assert that "after
several years of the State's fairly consistent efforts to perform, with both cooperation and
assistance from Appellants, it became apparent on May I 6, 20 I 6, when the ACHD advised that
the required approach was unattainable, that the State no longer would be able to provide the
promised access." 13 The Days further allege that they "elected to pursue their claims upon the
information received on May 16, 2016, revealing the permanent nature of the elimination of

13

Appellants' Opening Brief. p. 31 (emphasis added).
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direct public access caused by the construction in 1996-97." 14 The Days also allege that "it was

the State's additional activity that caused the interference with Appellants' access and prevented
the Appellants from learning the full extent of the State's failure to meet its obligations, and

therefore, these circumstances require extension of any deadline to file suit." 15
This Court has rejected "engrafting a discovery procedure on I.C. § 5-224" because
'"[s]tatutes of limitation in Idaho are not tolled by judicial construction but rather by the
expressed language of the statute'." McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 218 (quoting Independent School
District of Boise City v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 63, 539 P.2d 987, 991 (1975)). "Moreover, it is

well settled that uncertainty as to the amount of damages cannot bar recovery so long as the
underlying cause of action is determined." McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 218 ( citing Bartlett v. Peak,
107 Idaho 284,285,688 P.2d 1189, 1190 (1984)).
Merely because the Days think that they did not discover that their damages were
permanent until May 16, 2016 is not a valid basis to change the accrual date of their inverse
condemnation claim from December 5, 1997.
2. To the extent a contract claim exists, it accrued December 5, 1997 and is now
time barred.

The trial court correctly found that the State did not breach the 1967 Right of Way
Contract. R pp. 93 7-38, fn. 14. The State promised the Owners of the Initial Day Property that
access would be available from right of way for a future frontage road, and the State kept this
14

Appellants· Opening Brief. p. 32 (emphasis added). The Days clearly state that they "did not and could not know
the true extent of the accrual of its claims until May 16, 2016" because "it was not until that date that it was
apparent to the Appellants that the destructive consequences of the Interchange construction were not temporary."
Id.

is Appellants'

Opening Brief. p. 46 (emphasis added).
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promise by purchasing right of way for the future frontage road from other property owners as
part of the I-80N project in the 1960's.
The Days argue that the 1961 Agreement for possession, the 1967 Right of Way Contract
or the 1967 Warranty Deed contractually obligated the State to build a road to the Initial Day
Property. Even assuming the State obligated itself to build a public access road, none of those
documents set forth a time frame for the State to do so. A court would therefore apply a
reasonable time period. Any reasonable time period and the relevant statute of limitations would
have expired decades ago in the thirty years between the 1967 Right of Way Contract and
Warranty deed and construction of the Isaacs Canyon [C.
The Days have alleged that breach of the State's contractual obligation to build a public
access road occurred in 1997. 16•17•18 As noted above, the Days also stipulated to December 5,
1997 as the date of valuation for their contract claims. The Days attempt to avoid application of
the statute oflimitations to their contract claims by arguing that the State's efforts to address the
Days' concerns converted their damages from permanent to "temporary" until 2016. Therefore,
according to the Days, not until 2016 did the contract causes of action accrue and the five year
statute of limitations 19 begin to run.
Contrary to the Days' argument, a "cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon
the breach even though no damage may occur until later." Mason v. Tucker & Assocs., 125
Idaho 429,436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1994). As this Court noted, even without damages,
16

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Para. 55, R p. 31 .
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Para. 60, R p. 32.
18
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R p. 373.
19
l.C. § 5-216.
17

16

a party to a breached contract can bring an action for specific performance. Mason, 125 Idaho at
436. Thus, the Days could have filed a contract claim seeking specific performance in 1997
when they allege the State breached its contract to build a public road. Their characterization of
their damages as "temporary" holds no legal significance.
Where, as in the case at bar, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to when a cause of
action accrued, this Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate based on the statute of
limitations. Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209, 409 P.3d 789 (2017). Except
for the lack of a waiver, the facts of Swafford are strikingly similar to the facts of this case.
In Swafford, 163 Idaho 209, the plaintiffs made a 2007 contractual purchase of property
in a housing development. In apparent violation of the development's master plan, access from
the plaintiffs' property to a local street was cut off in 2008 by construction of various
improvements. In 2014, the plaintiffs complained to the developer about the lack of access, and
upon failing to obtain relief, filed suit in 2015 alleging, among other claims, breach of contract.
The defendant developer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively,
for summary judgment, asserting the plaintiffs' claims were time barred.

The plaintiffs

responded that their claims were not time barred because they believed that the development
project would be completed as originally promised in the master plan. Therefore, they were not
"fully aware" of their damages until 2014 when the developer denied their requested relief.
Swafford, 163 Idaho 209, _

, 409 P.3d 789, 791 (2017).

The trial court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and ruled that the five
year statute of limitations had run on the contract claim. The trial court held that the contract
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claim accrued when the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the breach of contract by either the
filing of a plat in 2007 showing no access or by no later than 2008 when the access-blocking
improvements were constructed.
This Court upheld the grant of summary judgment, observing that a "cause of action
accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action exists." Swafford, 163
Idaho at _ _, 409 P.3d at 792 (quoting Lido Van & Storage, Inc. v. Kuck, 110 Idaho 939, 942,
719 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1986)).

The breach of contract became apparent by no later than 2008

upon construction of the improvements preventing access to the local street, which construction
was either an anticipatory or present breach of the contract. In either case, by 2015 the contract
claim was time barred.
The holding of Swafford applies to the Days' contract claims because no genuine issue of
material fact exists to challenge the fact that the Days' contract claims accrued on December 5,
1997. Even if the Days' damages from any alleged breach of contract were "temporary" instead
of permanent, the date that the contract claim accrued would not change from December 5, 1997.
As of that date, the Days could have filed suit seeking, at minimum, specific performance. 20
They did not file their complaint until 2016, so the Days' claims are time barred and the grant of
summary judgment should be upheld.
The Days' reliance on Balivi Chem. Corp. v. Indus. Ventilation, Inc., 131 Idaho 449,
958 P .2d 606 (Ct. App. 1998) for their argument that their damages were temporary is clearly

20

In fact, the Days admit that "looking back, the construction of the Interchange initially ruined access and breached
the parties' agreement and therefore did give rise to an accrual argument." Appellants' Opening Brief. pp. 33-34.
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misplaced. 21

Balivi Chem. Corp. involves a 1989 oral contract requiring Balivi Chemical

Corporation (Balivi) to pay Industrial Ventilation, Inc. (IVI) for services as rendered and a
March 30, 1990 oral contract providing that a payment of $396,311.52 from Bali vi to IVI would
be refunded and invoiced at a later date for tax purposes. On March 30, 1990, IVI issued a credit
memo to Bali vi in the amount of $396,311.52. Future services provided by IVI for Bali vi were
billed against the credit memo until the credit was used up as of November 1990. Balivi was
never billed for any subsequent services provided by IVI.
During ensuing litigation initiated by Balivi, by its answer and counterclaim dated
November 4, 1994, IVI claimed that Balivi still owed the $396,311.52. Balivi answered the
counterclaim, asserting the four year statute of limitations for an oral contract. The trial court
ruled that the statute began to run as of December 13, 1989, the date of the first oral contract and
initial invoice for the $396,311.52 from IVI to Balivi, and expired on December 13, 1993,
barring IVI's claim.
On appeal, Balivi argued the contract breached was the 1989 oral agreement to pay for
services rendered to IVI, and that the statute of limitations on an action for goods delivered or
services rendered begins to run on the date of the last delivery or performance. IVI asserted the
statute began to run from the date of breach of the March 30, 1990 oral contract, and that the
breach could not have occurred until after Balivi was billed and failed to pay.
The issue as framed by this Court was to determine when the IVI counterclaim accrued.
To resolve that issue, this Court had to first determine which oral contract - the December 13,
21

The Days also cite Schwartz v. Wasserburger, 117 Nev. 703, 30 P.3d 1114 (2001), but that case has no relevance
as it involves anticipatory breach.
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I989 one or the March 30, 1990 one - had been breached. This Court rejected the December I 3,
1989 contract as the source of the alleged breach because Bali vi had paid off the $396,3 I 1.52 by
March 30, 1990. This Court further reasoned that the March 30, 1990 oral contract could not
have been breached until IVI rebilled Balivi for the $396,311.52, and that could not have
occurred until after the entire $396,311.52 was returned to Balivi in November 1990. Because
Balivi had not been rebilled for the $396,311.52, no breach of contract occurred and the statute
of limitations could not have started to run.
Plainly, Balivi Chem. Corp. bears no resemblance to the facts of this case. Unlike Balivi
Chem. Corp., there is no dispute as to which contract could give rise to a breach of contract

claim.

Nor is there any dispute that the taking or breach occurred on December 5, 1997. The

Days argue that their situation is similar to Balivi Chem. Corp. because construction of the Isaacs
Canyon IC "interrupted the parties agreement for the future frontage road to the Property, and
Appellants would have had to conclude that the State's obligation would never be fulfilled to
then file suit."22 No such fact pattern exists in Balivi Chem. Corp.
The Days' contract claims, to the extent that a breach of any contract exists, accrued as of
December 5, 1997. As such, the statute of limitations began to run at that point and the contract
claims are now time barred.

22

Appellants' Opening Brief. p. 30.
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3. Efforts to resolve access concerns did not toll or extend the statute of
limitations period.
The Days argue that the efforts made by the State to address the Days' access concerns
following completion of the Isaacs Canyon IC somehow change the date of accrual or toll the
statute of limitations period. 23 Essentially, the Days argue that efforts to resolve or settle a
potential claim toll the statute of limitations, yet they cite no authority for that proposition.
Worse, their argument directly contradicts the project completion rule adopted by this Court.
Although Idaho does not appear to have any cases directly on point, it seems to be a
generally accepted principle that settlement negotiations do not toll the statute of limitations.
See, Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc., 98 So. 3d 1046 (Miss. 2012); Crumpton v. Humana,
Inc., 1983-NMSC-034, 99 N.M. 562, 661 P.2d 54; K.A.R. v. T.G.l., 2014 PA Super 285, 107
A.3d 770 (2014); Lockard v. Deitch, 855 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App. 1993); City of Brooksville v.
Hernando Cty., 424 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Kurcer v. Companhia Nacional De
Navegacao, 48 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Term 1944).

Idaho has recognized that settlement

negotiations do not toll the period for service of process under I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Elliott v. Verska,
152 Idaho 280,271 P.3d 678 (2012).
The Days have provided no relevant authority supporting the argument that the State's
efforts to address their access concerns over the years following project completion extended or
tolled the statute of limitations. 24 Nor is there any validity to the Days' argument that the alleged

23

See Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 32-34; 47.

24

Contrary to the Days' assertion, the State did not disavow any contractual obligation, so the unpublished opinion
in Club Lane Association v. Armstrong, 1983 WL 879124 (April 20, 1983), is ofno relevance.
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"temporary" nature of their damages tolls or extends the statute of limitations. The undisputed
facts clearly establish December 5, 1997 as the date the Days' causes of action accrued.
4. Because the State's waiver only restarted the statute of limitations period, the
Days' inverse condemnation and contract claims are time barred.

The Days rely on the waiver of the statute of limitations defense made by former Deputy
Attorney General Steve Parry in his letter of July 19, 2000 to argue that the limitations period has
been tolled from 1997 to the filing of their complaint in 2016. The Days argue that the waiver
has a contingency that must be met before the waiver expires, essentially asserting that it is a
promise without a time limit. However, at most, Parry's waiver merely extended the limitations
period for a reasonable time, and the Days' claims are time barred.
In Idaho, the statute of limitations "is to be liberally construed, and must be applied in all
cases where an exception is not specifically made." Mendini v. Milner, 47 Idaho 439, 276 P.
313, 314 (1929) {citing Vandall v. Teague, 142 Cal. 471, 76 P. 35 (1904)). Further, "statutes
creating exemptions are to be strictly construed and will not be extended by implication."
Mendini, 47 Idaho at

, 276 P. at 314.

Only one relevant statutory exception exists to the application of the statute of
limitations, and that is I.C. § 5-238:
Acknowledgment or new promise - Effect on operation of statute - Effect of
partial payment. - No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a
new or continuing contract by which to take the case out of the operation of this
chapter, unless the same is contained in some writing, signed by the party to be
charged thereby; but any payment of principal or interest is equivalent to a new
promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the debt.

22

The statute does not state the effect of taking a case out of the operation of the statute of
limitations chapter, except to reference the resulting "new or continuing contract". However, the
same statutory language has been in effect for a long time in Idaho and has been interpreted to
restart the statute of limitations period:
The plea of the statute is a personal one, and therefore may be waived, either in
an action commenced, where failure to plead it waives it, or it may be waived by
the debtor by writing, under the provisions of section 4078, Rev. St., which is as
follows: "No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or
continuing contract, by which to take the case out of the operation of this title,
unless the same is contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby." The effect of said acknowledgment was to remove the bar, and to
furnish, under the statute, "sufficient evidence" to "take the case out of the
operation" of our limitation statutes, and start anew the running of the bar of the
statute.
Moulton v. Williams, 6 Idaho 424, 55 P. 1019, 1019 (1899) (emphasis added).

Case law interpreting l.C. § 5-238 typically involves efforts to collect payment on debt
and a waiver by the debtor of the right to assert a statute of limitations defense. However, such
cases are instructive as they confirm that a waiver of the statute of limitations defense only
extends the statute of limitations period by one statutory term. See, Horkley v. Horkley, 144
Idaho 879, 173 P.3d 1138 (2007); Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762,472 P.2d 328 (1970); Dern v.
Olsen, 18 Idaho 358, 110 P. 164 (1910); Kelly v. Leachman, 3 Idaho 629, 33 P. 44 (1893);
Modern Mills, Inc. v. Havens, 112 Idaho 1101, 739 P.2d 400 (Ct. App. 1987). 25

Other jurisdictions agree that a waiver of the statute of limitations defense is not in
perpetuity. Rather, the waiver extends the statute of limitations period from either the end of the
25

1 he Days claim that Brower 1·. £./. DuPont De Nemours & Co.. 11 7 Idaho 780, 79'2 P.2d 345 {1990) stands for
the proposition that I.C. ~ 5-238 appl ies to debt situations only is tota lly baseless.

23

original limitations period or from the date the waiver was made. See, Munter v. Lanliford, 232
F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Tr. Co., 134 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.
1943); Noel v. Baskin, 131 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1942); First Nat. Bank v. Mock, 70 Colo. 517,
203 P. 272 ( 1921 ). Ahmad v. Eastpines Terrace Apartments, Inc., 200 Md. App. 362, 28 A.3d 1
(2011); Haggerty v. Williams, 84 Conn. App. 675, 855 A.2d 264 (2004).
Applying Idaho case law interpreting LC. § 5-238 to Parry's waiver, it restarted the
limitations period as of the date of the waiver. Therefore, the statute of limitations on the
contract claims ran until July 19, 2005 and on the inverse condemnation claim until July 19,
2004. Both of those statutory periods have long since run and the claims are now time barred.
The Parry waiver does not contain any time frame for the parties to reach an agreement
on the location of the access easement. That does not mean that the waiver is open-ended as
argued by the Days. In the absence of a time for performance, "the law implies that performance
must occur within a reasonable time." Balivi Chemical Corp., 958 P.2d at 609. Thus, if this
Court did not apply the holding in the line of cases holding that the statutory period is restarted
per LC. § 5-238, then a reasonable time period for the contingency to occur must be imposed.
Idaho does not appear to have case law on a reasonable time for a contingent waiver.
Other jurisdictions that have looked at this issue have used a period of time equivalent to the
relevant statute of limitations period. Collins v. Envtl. Sys. Co., 3 F.3d 238 (8th Cir. 1993)
(interpreting Minnesota law); Munter, 232 F.2d 373; Noel, 131 F.2d 231; Slayton v. Slayton, 521
So. 2d 928 (Ala. 1988). If this Court were to apply a reasonable time frame for the contingency
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to occur, equivalent to the statute of limitations period, then the contract claims were time barred
as of July 19, 2010, and the inverse condemnation claim time barred as ofJuly 19, 2008.
The Days argue that the waiver was a tolling or standstill agreement that was in effect
until no agreement on an access easement was reached, regardless of how long that took. Case
law cited by the Days does not support their argument because those cases challenge the validity
of an open ended waiver, not how long the waiver should last.26
For example, the Days cite United States v. Caldwell, 859 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1988), a
criminal case in which an open ended waiver was deemed valid, but the reasonableness of the
time frame of the waiver was not an issue. In relation to the length of time of the waiver, the
court did note that what "the prosecutor may not do, of course, is unnecessarily delay an
indictment during the additional time period." Caldwell, 859 F.2d at 808. Here, the Days have
delayed unnecessarily the filing of their claims for an inordinate length of time.
Similarly, Atlas Fin. Corp. v. Kenny, 68 Cal. App. 2d 504, I 57 P .2d 40 I ( I945), cited by
the Days, merely stands for the proposition that the statute of limitations can be waived. It does
not address the reasonableness standard to be applied to the length of an open ended waiver.

In

Atlas Fin. Corp., the plaintiffs property was seized in December I 939 by the government, which
waived the three year statute of limitations in 1940 by promising the plaintiff that it could file
suit to recover its property at its convenience. The plaintiff made a demand for return of its

26

In Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 90 P.3d 894 (2004), cited by the Days, a
tolling agreement specifically tolled the statute of limitations for about twenty-three months and was not an issue
raised on appeal. The case has no relevance to the case at bar. Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 48
P.3d 636 (2002), only stands for the proposition that the statute of limitations can be waived. Whether the statute
of limitations can be waived is not at issue in this case.
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property in 1942 and filed suit in 1943.

The court found that the although the suit was filed

more than three years after the seizure of property, it was timely filed because it was filed within
three years of making a demand for return of the property. The facts of Atlas Fin. Corp. bear no
resemblance to the genesis of the Days' claims and its holding is therefore inapposite.
LC. § 5-238 provides the only statutory mechanism to avoid application of the statute of
limitations, permitting a waiver if it is in writing and signed. Doing so takes the case "out of the
operation of this chapter" and restarts the limitations period. Even if the waiver is contingent, a
reasonable time frame for occurrence of the contingency would be one statutory period,
essentially doubling the statute of limitations period. In either case, the Days' claims are time
barred and the Judgment should be affirmed.
C. Based on the statute of limitations, the trial court properly granted of summary
judgment as to all the Days' claims

1. Failure to notify the parties about treating the State's motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment was harmless error.

"If - by considering only the pleadings - this Court finds under Rule 12(b)(6) that
Appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, then the procedural error
below is harmless." Paslay, 162 Idaho at 872 (citing Taylor, 149 Idaho at 849). The trial court's
failure to notify the parties that it was going to treat the State's motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment was harmless error because the Days' Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. No set of facts exist that could stretch the statute of limitations for
sixteen years from the date of the State's waiver until the Days finally filed their claims.
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First, there is no merit to the Days' claim that their claims did not accrue until 2016. The
case law is clear. An inverse condemnation claim accrues under the project completion rule. C
& G. Inc., 139 Idaho 140. A contract claim accrues upon a breach. Mason, 125 Idaho at 436.

The Days have failed to cite any meaningful contrary authority.
The accrual of the Days' inverse condemnation and contract claims are established in
their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, wherein the Days repeatedly asserted that the State
took their access rights and breached its contractual obligations by constructing the Isaacs
Canyon IC in 1997. 27 The following are a couple of examples:
The Interchange was also constructed over the top of portions of the unimproved
50 ft. public right-of-way ... ITD took that right-of-way access without providing
just compensation. 28
In 1996-97, ITD breached the agreement by constructing the Interchange and the
extension of the frontage road but not connecting the Day Property with the
public roads. 29
Given that the Days filed their complaint about nineteen years after their causes of action
accrued, the only remaining question is whether a reason exists to avoid application of the statute
of limitations to bar their claims.
The Days rely on the State's waiver from July 19, 2000 to claim that they have an openended extension on the statute of limitations until they could reach an agreement with the State
on access. As discussed above, LC. § 5-238 allows a waiver, but for only a reasonable time.
This Court has interpreted such waivers to restart the statute of limitations period. The State's
See, Complaint, ,r 13, R pp. 17-18; ,r 14, R p. 18; ,r 19, R p. 19; ,r 47, R p. 30; ,r 51, R pp. 30-31; 1 55, R p. 31; ii
60, R p. 32.
28
Complaint, ,i 14, R p. 18.
29
Complaint, ,i 55, R p. 31.
27
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waiver does not provide a time frame for the parties to come to an agreement, so one would be
provided by the court. A time frame equivalent to the statutory period is reasonable, as other
jurisdictions have found, and would essentially double the statute of limitations period. That
would still leave the Days' claims time barred.
As was also discussed above, the Days claim that their damages were temporary until
May 2016 is clearly without merit as a matter of law. Similarly, the efforts of the parties to
resolve access issues does not, as a matter of law, extend or toll the statute of limitations period.
Given the clear allegations in the complaint establishing 1997 as the date of accrual for
the Days' claims and the lack of any basis to waive, extend or toll that period more than two
statutory periods beyond the State's waiver in July 2000, this Court should uphold the grant of
summary judgment on the basis of harmless error because the Days complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted because there is no set of facts that the Days could prove
to avoid application of the statute of limitations to their claims.

2. The Days waived notice of conversion of the State's motion to dismiss and
had a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent material.
"The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim are those appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court
may properly judicially notice." Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153
(Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis in original). "If a trial court considers factual allegations outside the
pleading on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it errs if it fails to convert the motion to one for summary
judgment." Hellickson, 118 Idaho at 276 (citing Fonte v. Bd. of Managers of Cont'/ Towers
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Condo., 848 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1988); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989)). A court may

not take evidence by judicial notice:
"The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim are those appearing in the complaint, supplemented by
such facts as the court may properly judicially notice. [cite omitted] However, a
trial court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, has no right to hear
evidence; and since judicial notice is merely a substitute for the conventional
method of taking evidence to establish facts, the court has no right to take judicial
notice of anything, with the possible exception offacts ofcommon knowledge
which controvert averments of the complaint.
Hellickson, 118 Idaho at 276. If a court uses factual allegations from outside the complaint, it

must convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion and notify the parties so
they have an opportunity to present pertinent material. I.R.C.P. 12(d).
The Days argue that the trial court erred by converting the State's Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to a summary judgment motion because the parties did not present matters outside of the Days'
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial to the trial court. The record establishes that they did.

Several references and documents containing factual allegations not included in the
Complaint were presented to the trial court at the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss on

August 14, 2017.

For example, the Days referenced an affidavit of Donna Day Jacobs in

response to the State's argument, a document that was not attached to the Complaint. Tr p. 92,
LL. 13-21; p. 94, LL. 6-16. The Days' also referenced an exhibit attached to an affidavit of
James Morrison30 , which exhibit is not attached to the Complaint. Tr p. 96, LL. 3-13. Reaching
outside the boundaries of their Complaint, the Days argued that the State was creating Eisenman

,o See Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofJames Morrison filed April 28, 2017. R pp. 219-223.
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Road as part of the I-80N project, and that the Ada County Highway District has since accepted
jurisdiction over Eisenman Road. Tr p. 96, L. 14 - p. 97, L. 7. The Days then referenced
another exhibit to an affidavit of James Morrison31 , a document that is not attached to the Days'
Complaint. Tr p. 97, L. 8 - p. 98, L. 7. The Days argued what the Days ancestors were thinking

in 1967, clearly material that is outside the confines of the Complaint. Tr p. 98, LL. 8-23. The
Days referenced a letter from Andrew White that is not attached to the Complaint to argue that
the State was providing an access easement or right of way from Boise to Mountain Home. Tr p.
99, LL. 3-8. Significantly, the Days then ask the trial court to take judicial notice of a recorded
record of survey that is not part of the record at the time of the hearing, which record of survey
allegedly shows an access easement extending into Day Property. Tr p. 101, L. 25 - p. 102, L.

I 1.
The State responded to the Days' comments by referencing the appraisal of Mr. Stout and
of Mr. Onweiler from 1967, which are not part of the Complaint, but are exhibits to the Affidavit
ofJames Morrison. 32 Tr p. 114, L. 5 - p. 115, L. 13. The State then referenced affidavits from

Dave Szplett and the State's District 3 District Engineer to argue that the Days could get access
to their property. Tr p. 115, LL. I 4-25.

The State then made a reference to an exhibit to a letter

attached to an affidavit from James Morrison regarding when the Isaacs Canyon IC was
completed. 33

The letter and its exhibit are not attached to the Complaint. The Days registered

no objection to the State's reference to material outside the allegations in the Complaint.

31

The referenced exhibit is attached to the Affidavit ofJames Morrison filed June 7, 2017. R pp. 515-523.
R pp. 456 - 489.
33
Trp.117,LL.14-15.
32

30

The Days also presented matters outside their Complaint in their memorandum34 in
response to the State's Motion to Dismiss by specifically referring to the parties' stipulation to
December 5, 1997 as the date for valuation purposes and arguing that it did not establish the date
of accrual of the Days' causes of action. R pp. 819, fn. 3 on 82 I, 822. The Days' response also
referenced their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the State's waiver of the
statute of limitations defense, how the trial court should view that memorandum in light of the
State's motion to dismiss, and how the State responded to the Days' motion. R p. 8 I 5. In
another reference to matters outside the complaint, the Days also assert that "none of the parties
were aware in I 967 of the full extent of the deprivation of access to the Day Property, nor could
they have been aware in I997 that the State's subsequent multiple and continued efforts to
ensure that access was accomplished after the Isaac's Canyon Interchange was constructed
would be permanently thwarted several years later". R p. 820.
In response to the Days' memorandum, the State did present matters outside the
complaint, to include referencing the stipulation on the valuation date (R p. 885), concessions
made by the Days regarding the date of accrual in response to the State's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (R p. 887), and referenced the State's Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: No Marketable or Insurable Title (R p. 892).
Plainly, material not limited to the facts alleged in the Complaint was presented to the
trial court, and the Days were the first ones to do so. By presenting to the court material or
matters not set forth in their own complaint, the Days should be found to have waived the right
34

Rpp.814 - 831.
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to notice that the trial court intended to convert the motion to dismiss to a summary judgment
motion. See, Leone v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 101 A.3d 869, 873 (R.I. 2014); Bretz v.

Ayers, 232 Mont. 132, 756 P.2d 1115 (1988); Geary v. Missouri State Employees' Ret. Sys., 878
S.W.2d 918,921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
The trial court acted properly in converting the State's motion to dismiss to a Rule 56
motion. The court did not give required notice to the parties that it was doing so, but the actions
of the parties in submitting material not contained in the Complaint should excuse the lack of
notice. Moreover, the error was harmless because as the hearing transcript makes abundantly
clear, the Days had a reasonable opportunity to present all pertinent material regarding the
State's motion. Additionally, prior to the State filing its motion to dismiss, the Days had filed
their partial summary judgment motion on the statute of limitations issue, thereby providing
them with ample opportunity to fully brief the statute oflimitations issue. 35
D. Only two of the Days have standing to pursue an inverse condemnation claim
1. Only owners of property at the time an inverse condemnation claim accrues

can recover damages.

There is no dispute that as of December 5, 1997, only two of the current
plaintiffs/appellants, Donna Day Jacobs and David R. Day, had an ownership interest in the Day
Property. As such, they are the only two that have standing to pursue an inverse condemnation
claim arising out of construction of the Isaacs Canyon IC.

35

Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Access and Waiver ofStatute of
Limitation Defense. R pp. 231, 247-49.
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Idaho lacks case law specifically addressing standing in an inverse condemnation case.
However, case law from other states and federal jurisdictions leaves no doubt that in order to
have standing, the party prosecuting an inverse condemnation action must have been the owner
of the property at the time of the alleged taking:
The law is well-settled that "any damage suffered as a result of [a] taking
. .. would have been suffered by the owner at the time the damage became
ascertainable [.] ... [T]he damage claim based on inverse condemnation
[does} not pass to subsequent grantees of the land." [cites omitted] This
approach is correct, for if the damage has already occurred to the land, then
the sellers and buyers had at least constructive notice of the damage and could
accommodate its effect on the land's value in negotiating the purchase price.
To also allow subsequent grantees to recover damages for inverse
condemnation would result in a windfall.

State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v. Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Mo. 2008) (emphasis added).
See also, United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 20-21, 78 S. Ct. 1039, 1043-44, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1109
(1958) ("'For it is undisputed that '(since) compensation is due at the time of taking, the owner at
that time, not the owner at an earlier or later date, receives the payment."') (quoting Danforth v.

United States, 308 U.S. 271,284, 60 S. Ct. 231,236, 84 L. Ed. 240 (1939)); CRV Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("It is well established that 'only
persons with a valid property interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.'")
(quoting Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); Huntleigh USA Corp. v.

United States, 525 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Dep't of Forests,

Parks & Recreation v. Town of Ludlow Zoning Bd., 2004 VT 104, 177 Vt. 623, 869 A.2d 603
(2004); Brooks Inv. Co. v. City of Bloomington, 305 Minn. 305, 232 N.W.2d 911 (1975); City of
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Los Angeles v. Ricards, 10 Cal. 3d 385, 515 P.2d 585 (1973); Majestic Heights Co. v. Bd. ofCty.
Comm'rs ofJefferson Cty., 173 Colo. 178,476 P.2d 745 (1970) en bane.; Boyd v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. Co., 39 Ariz. 154, 4 P .2d 670 ( 1931 ); Monen v. State Dep't of Highways, Div. of
Highways, 33 Colo. App. 69, 515 P.2d 1246 (1973); See generally, Nichols on Eminent Domain,

Vol. 2, § 5.01[5][d][i] at p. 5-37, (rev. 3d ed. 2003).
Further, in order to have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, "litigants generally
must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201
P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757,
763 (1989)).

Out of all the plaintiffs, only Donna Day Jacobs and David R. Day had an

ownership interest in the Day Property in the period from December 1997 through April 1998.
Thus, only they can demonstrate an injury in fact that could be redressed by judicial relief.
This Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment to the State as to all other
plaintiffs/appellants who brought an inverse condemnation claim.

2. An inverse condemnation claim is personal property and therefore is not
appurtenant to real property.
The Days seek to avoid their lack of standing by arguing that the inverse condemnation
claim and/or its proceeds passed to current owners with title to the Day Property. The argument
is meritless.
The right to an inverse condemnation claim is personal property that does not transfer
with land:
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It is established law that if property is taken before the death of the owner, the
right to compensation is not considered incident to the real estate but is a chose
in action, passes to personal representatives, and will not be included in a devise
of real estate taken. If the taking of the property did not occur until after the death
of the owner, the heirs, or if there be a will, the devisees of the land taken are
entitled to the compensation. Nichols, Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Sec. 5.5 and
5.5(1 )(2); [cites omitted].
LaFontaine's Heirs at Law & Next of Kin v. LaFontaine's Heirs at Law & Next of Kin, 205 Md.
311, 315- 18, 107 A.2d 653, 654 ( 1954) (emphasis added). See also, In re Burnett's Estate, 49
N.J. Super. 439, 140 A.2d 242 (Co. Prob. Div. 1958). The holding of LaFontaine 1s Heirs at Law
& Next of Kin is consistent with Idaho law, which defines real property as:

1. Lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and water rights, and mining claims,
both lode and placer.
2. That which is affixed to land.
3. That which is appurtenant to land.
I.C. § 55-101. Plainly, the right to an inverse condemnation claim is not included in the first or
second definition under LC. § 55-101.

As for the third definition, Idaho has adopted the

definition of"appurtenant" as set forth in Black's Law Dictionary:
A thing is "appurtenant" to something else when it stands in relation of an
incident to a principal and is necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of
the latter. A thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by
right used with the land for its benefit, as in the case of a way, or water-course, or
of a passage for light, air, or heat from or across the land of another.

McKay v. Walker, 160 Idaho 148, 152- 53, 369 P.3d 926, 930-31 (2016) fn.l (emphasis in
original). A condemnation claim is obviously not "connected with the use and enjoyment" of
land or a "right used with the land for its benefit". Therefore, an inverse condemnation action is
personal property.
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I.C. § 73-l 14(2)(e) further defines real property as ''coextensive with lands, tenements
and hereditaments, possessory rights and claims." A condemnation claim is not "coextensive
with lands, tenements and hereditaments".
Because an inverse condemnation claim is not real property, it is personal property:
"Every kind of property that is not real is personal." I.C. § 55-102. More specifically, personal
property "includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidences of debt and general
intangibles as defined in the uniform commercial code - secured transactions."

I.C. § 73-

I 14(2)(c) (emphasis added). See also, Karle v. Visser, 141 Idaho 804, 807, 118 P.3d 136, 139
(2005) (citing In re Richardson, 216 B.R. 206, 219 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997)). A "chose in
action" is also known as a "thing in action", and is personal property:
A proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another person, a share
in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort. 2. The right to bring an
action to recover a debt, money, or thing. 3. Personal property that one person
owns but another person possesses, the owner being able to regain possession
through a lawsuit. - Also termed thing in action; right in action.
Black's Law Dictionary (101h ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
Relying on the statutory definition of real property, in McKay, 160 Idaho at 152- 53, this
Court held that a mortgage is not real property:
Idaho Code section 55-101 is the other statute providing a definition of "real
property." The definition found in that statute includes: (1) "Lands, possessory
rights to land, ditch and water rights, and mining claims, both lode and placer;"
(2) "That which is affixed to land"; and, (3) "That which is appurtenant to land."
LC. § 55- 101. A mortgage is not land. A mortgage does not create a possessory
right to land. A mortgage is not a ditch or water ri~t nor is it a mining claim. A
mortgage is not affixed to land nor is it appurtenant 6 to land. In short, a mortgage
36

This Court referenced the Black's Law Dictionary definition of"appurtenant" to interpret the statute. McKay, 160
Idaho at 152-53, fu. l.
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simply is not real property as defined by Idaho Code section 55- 10 I. Because a
mortgage is not real property, it is personal property. I.C. § 55- 102.

McKay, 160 Idaho at 152- 53.

The same analysis holds true for a claim base on mverse

condemnation.
Idaho law provides that a chose in action ..arising out of the violation of a right of
property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner." I.C. § 55-402. Otherwise,
..[u]pon the death of the owner it passes to his personal representatives, except where, in the
cases provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, it passes to his devisees or successor in office."

Id. See, Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 PJd 346,
351 (2004) ("Idaho recognizes that choses in action are generally assignable.") (citing

McCluskey v. Galland, 95 Idaho 472, 474-75, 511 P.2d 289, 291- 92 (1973)).

Moreover,

"[ o ]rdinarily, the word 'assignment' is limited in its application to a transfer of intangible rights,
including contractual rights, choses in action, and rights in or connected with property, as
distinguished from transfer of the property itself." Purco Fleet Services, Inc., 140 Idaho at 126

(quoting 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignment§ 1 (1999) (emphasis added)).
The language used to transfer ownership of the Day Property only conveyed real
property, not personal property. As described by the Days, the relevant deed language states:
"all and singular the buildings, structures, improvements, tenements, hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, the reversion and reversions,
remainder and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof." R pp. 571-72. Such language
essentially reflects the definition of real property found at LC.§ 55-101 and I.C. § 73-114(2)(e).
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The additional terms of "reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders, rents, issues and
profits thereof' do not include a claim for inverse condemnation. Per the Days, the language
used in the "LLC Deeds" consisted of the real property "together with any undiscovered interest
therein, together with all of the appurtenances pertaining thereto." R p. 572. That language is of
no help to the Days, as it only references real property and does not assign personal property.
Nowhere in the Day Property deeds is there an assignment of the right to an inverse
condemnation claim or the proceeds therefrom.
The Days cite to inapposite case law that does not involve personal property.

For

example, Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 ( 1958) merely stands for the principle that
property abutting a roadway has a general access easement that cannot be taken without
compensation. Hughes does not involve whether a claim based on loss of that access right is
personal or real property that is automatically transferred to a purchaser of the real property.
The Days also argue that all real property interests are transferred unless reserved by the
granter, citing Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 (2007) (water
rights pass with real property unless reserved by granter); Crandall v. Goss, 30 Idaho 661, 167 P.
1025 (1917) (a claim of adverse possession can be maintained by a homesteader against an
easement abandoned by railroad); Paddock v. Clark, 22 Idaho 498, 126 P. 1053 (1912) (water is
real property appurtenant to land, but grantor can reserve water rights upon transfer of land).
None of those cases involve personal property rights or the transfer of an inverse condemnation
claim and therefore fail to support the Days' argument.
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The Days also rely on inapposite case law to argue that a conveyance of property can
include the rights to an award of money arising out of a condemnation.

Bank of Am. of

California v. City of Glendale, 4 Cal. 2d 477, 50 P.2d 1035 (1935) has nothing to do with
whether an inverse condemnation claim, as personal property, can be conveyed with real
property without an assignment of the personal property. It only stands for the proposition that in
a direct condemnation case, damages are "paid to the person or persons owning the property...
when the right to the compensation becomes an enforceable demand against the condemnor."

Bank of America of California, 50 P.2d at 1037.

In the Days' situation, the right to

compensation accrued on December 5, 1997 when their access rights were allegedly taken. Only
those who were owners at that time could receive proceeds from the demand, and those owners
include only two of the current plaintiffs.

Clay Cty. v. Howard, 95 Neb. 389, 145 N.W. 982 (1914) is of no help to the Days. In
Clay County, the county started condemnation proceedings for a road, but abandoned the effort
without taking the land or paying any compensation. The owners conveyed the property ten
years later without any reservation for the road right of way. The county then sought to obtain
the right of way for the road, and made payment for it into the court, asking it to decide to whom
payment should be made, the current owner or the grantor. The court held that because no land
was taken while the grantor owned the property, the current owner should get the funds as they
were the owners when the taking actually occurred:
At the time that the Howards conveyed the land to Grant, and he conveyed to
Wiberg and McClellan, no portion of it had been taken for a public highway. No
actual easement existed over the land at the time the Howards conveyed it away,
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so that the cases holding that one who buys land with an existing easement
takes the land as he finds it, and the right to damages remains with the vendor,
do not apply. Under such circumstances the owner of the land at the time it was
actually taken is the person who is entitled to recover the damages.
Clay County, 145 N.W. at 983 (emphasis added). In other words, had the damage to the property

- created in the Clay County case by the right of way easement - existed at the time of the sale,
the former owner/grantor would have been entitled to the compensation. The court's language
captures the argument that the State is making in this case- only an owner of the Day Property as
of December 5, 1997, when the land "was actually taken is the person who is entitled to recover
the damages."
Another case cited by the Days regarding the transfer of condemnation awards, In re
Twelfth Ave. S., 74 Wash. 132, 132 P. 868 (1913), relied upon by the Days, goes further in

supporting the State's position. The case involved a transfer of property before condemnation
proceedings were complete and property had been taken or damaged.

The Yesler Logging

Company owned the property when condemnation proceedings started and all the way through
the jury verdict awarding damages. Before judgment was entered and payment made, as well as
before the property was taken, the logging company sold the property to the Seattle Electric
Company. The electric company asked to be substituted in the proceedings for the logging
company, but the trial court denied the request.
Reversing, the appellate court pointed to owner of the property as of the date of the
occurrence of damage as the appropriate party to receive compensation:
In the absence of any reservation in the deed of conveyance to the contrary, or of
facts showing estoppel or other contravening equity, such as payment of a less
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price by reason of the pending condemnation proceeding, the person owning the
land at the time the right to take or damage it became irrevocable in the city
should be entitled to the compensation for such damage.
In re Twelfth Ave. South, 132 P. at 869 (emphasis added). Significantly, the court refers to the

right to compensation as a "vested personal right to enforce payment" once the condemnation
process is complete. In re Twelfth Ave. South, 132 P. at 870 (emphasis added). Damon v. Ryan,
74 Wash. 138, 132 P. 871 (I 913), also cited by the Days, is consistent with, and in fact relies on,
In re Twe((th Ave. South.

An inverse condemnation claim or a claim to the proceeds from that claim is personal
property. As such, they do not transfer with the fee simple estate as an appurtenance when the
fee simple estate is conveyed to another. The Days have failed to demonstrate that the deeds that
transferred ownership from the owners of the Day Property in I 997 also transferred personal
property consisting of a claim based on inverse condemnation.
E. The Warranty Deed does not Create an Obligation that Runs with the Land and
Requires the State to Provide Access to the Initial Day Property.

The Days now argue, which they did not do at the trial court level, that the 1967
Warranty Deed contains a promise by the State to build a public access road and that this
promise runs with the Day Property. 37 The Days assert that this promise provides standing for
them to bring a breach of contract claim. The argument has no merit.
A deed is a document that conveys land. Black's Law Dictionary (I 0 1h ed. 20 I 4 ). It is
not a bilateral contract, and so it cannot bind the State. Even if the Warranty Deed was a

37

Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 49-51.
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contract between the State and the Owners of the Initial Day Property, it does not provide that
the State will build a road. The Warranty Deed does nothing more than reserve access for the
Initial Day Property to the State's right of way for the "Future Frontage Road".
As a matter of law, the Warranty Deed could not create an obligation, by reservation or
exception, on the part of the State to build a road on property the Owners did not own. See,
Caps tar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 708, 152 P .3d 575, 579 (2007) ("An

express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some new right in the property being
conveyed; an express easement by exception operates by withholding title to a portion of the
conveyed property.") (emphasis added). In short, because the Initial Day Property never had any

ownership interests in the right of way purchased by the State from other property owners, the
Warranty Deed could not reserve or except rights compelling the State to build a road in that
right of way.
If the Warranty Deed did contractually obligate the State to build a public access road,

the statute of limitations on a breach of contract claim has long since run. This is not a situation
like the one in Hughes Farms, Inc. v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, 182 Neb. 791,
157 N.W.2d 384 (1968), cited by the Days, where the condemnor agreed to pay future damages
to the landowner as part of condemning an easement for power lines. Similarly, the holding in
Henderson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa 891, 151 N.W.2d 473 (1967), also cited by

the Days, merely stands for the unremarkable principle that obtaining fee title to land includes
ownership of the appurtenances, and that the condemnor must pay for those appurtenances
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regardless of what the condemnor states will happen to the property in the future. Henderson has
no relevance to the case at bar.
The Warranty Deed clearly does not contain a contractual obligation requiring the State
to build a public road to the Day Property. If it did, the statute of limitations on the contract ran
long ago. The Judgment of the trial court should therefore be affinned as to the lack of standing
of the Days to prosecute its contract claims.

F. Attorney Fees
Pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3), the State seeks attorney fees in relation to this appeal, at
least in relation to the Days' contract claims. This case has its genesis in a contract for the
acquisition of land - the 1967 Right of Way Contract - so the Days' contract claims clearly
involve a commercial transaction as defined in LC. § 12-120(3). See, Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho
247, 409 P.3d 827 (2018). The contract claims obviously do not fall into the "personal or
household purposes" exception set forth in the statute.

The essential question is whether the

Days "allege{d] the existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12120(3 )". Prop. Mgmt. W, Inc. v. Hunt, 126 Idaho 897, 900, 894 P.2d 130, 133 (1995). Having
alleged the existence of a commercial contractual relationship as the basis of their contract
claims, the Days have "trigger{ed] the application of I.C. § 12-120(3)". Property Management
West, Inc., 126 Idaho at 900. The State is therefore entitled to attorney fees.
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IV. Conclusion.

The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment entered by the trial
court and award attorney fees and costs on appeal to the State as well.
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